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ORI GIN AL ARTICLE
Mitochondrial replacement techniques: egg donation,
genealogy and eugenics
Ce´sar Palacios-Gonza´lez1
 The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Several objections against the morality of researching or employing
mitochondrial replacement techniques have been advanced recently. In this paper, I
examine three of these objections and show that they are found wanting. First I
examine whether mitochondrial replacement techniques, research and clinical
practice, should not be carried out because of possible harms to egg donors. Next I
assess whether mitochondrial replacement techniques should be banned because
they could affect the study of genealogical ancestry. Finally, I examine the claim
that mitochondrial replacement techniques are not transferring mitochondrial DNA
but nuclear DNA, and that this should be prohibited on ethical grounds.
Keywords Mitochondrial replacement techniques  Mitochondrial donation 
Maternal spindle transfer  Pronuclear transfer  Tri-parenthood 
Three parent babies  Three parent IVF
1 Introduction
Mitochondria are organelles which provide the energy necessary for cells to work
properly. Two characteristics of mitochondria are that they are only inherited via the
maternal line and that they possess their own DNA. Human diploid cells are
comprised of nuclear DNA, which accounts for around 99.9 %, and mitochondrial
DNA, which accounts for the other 0.1 % (Taylor et al. 2001).
Diseases caused by mitochondria not working properly have been named
‘mitochondrial disease’. Mitochondrial disease ‘‘can be caused by either problems
in the genes in the nucleus affecting mitochondrial function, or by problems in
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genes within the mitochondria themselves’’ (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2012, p.
vii). Mitochondrial DNA diseases (henceforth mtDNA diseases) are not one disease
but a group of neuromuscular diseases that range in their effects from mild to
devastating. They cause heart and major organ failure, dementia, stroke, blindness,
deafness, infant encephalopathy, and premature death (Department of Health 2014).
At present, there is no cure for mitochondrial diseases: the only way to treat them
is to tackle their symptoms in an effort to increase patients’ overall wellbeing.
Because of this, a lot of thought has been focused on how women affected by
mitochondrial diseases could have genetically related children that do not inherit
these diseases. Recent research has devised two different techniques which prevent
the passing of diseased mitochondria to further generations, while maintaining a
direct genetic link between the intending mother and the child: maternal spindle
transfer and pronuclear transfer. These solutions do not tackle all mitochondrial
diseases: they are effective for a subset in which there are problems within the genes
of mitochondria itself (Craven et al. 2010; Tachibana et al. 2009; Yabuuchi et al.
2012). From this point onwards, I will only concentrate on mtDNA diseases.1 Even
when maternal spindle transfer and pronuclear transfer—techniques that have been
popularly named ‘mitochondrial replacement techniques’ (henceforth MRTs)—
could help women to have genetically related children free from the mtDNA
diseases, there does not exist total support for them. Franc¸oise Baylis and Stuart A.
Newman have raised a number of important ethical objections against MRTs
(Baylis 2013; Newman 2013, 2014a, b).
In this paper, I will examine three of the objections that these two authors have
advanced and I will show that they are found wanting. I will also prove that even if we
accept Baylis’s and Newman’s positions, for the sake of argument, we would have to
accept that certain instances of MRTs are morally unproblematic. It is important to
address the objections that Baylis and Newman advance for three reasons: both are
important commentators on the ethics of reproductive techniques, which means that
their positions could impact policymaking processes; they have advanced objections
against MRTs that have been, for the most part, underexplored; and finally doing so
shows that the current UK regulatory stance,2 which allows MRTs, can be successfully
defended against these specific attacks (HFEA Regulations 2015).
The first argument that I will examine asserts that research surrounding MRTs
should not be carried out because of possible harms to egg donors. Next I assess if
MRTs should be banned because they could affect the study of genealogical
ancestry. Finally, I examine the claim that MRTs do not transfer mitochondrial
DNA but nuclear DNA, and that this should be prohibited on ethical grounds.3
1 Another technique (which I will not address here) that has been discussed in relation to tackling
mtDNA diseases is cytoplasmic transfer. This technique involves injecting cytoplasm from a donor’s
oocyte, with healthy mitochondria, into an oocyte with diseased mitochondria (Brenner et al. 2000).
2 For a discussion on the regulation of MRTs in the UK, see Appleby (2015).
3 It must be clear that in this paper I will not examine all the objections that have been presented against
MRTs, as I have previously said. For recent works on the ethics of MRTs, which deal with issues of
identity, see: Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2012), Institute of Medicine of the National Academies
(2016), Wrigley et al. (2015) and Bredenoord et al. (2011). On issues of transgenerational health risks,
see: Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2012), Institute of Medicine of the National Academies (2016),
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Before I start examining the arguments against MRTs, I will briefly describe both
techniques.
2 Mitochondrial replacement techniques
As previously stated, maternal spindle transfer and pronuclear transfer are the two
techniques envisaged to aid women afflicted by mtDNA diseases to have genetically
related children free from mtDNA disease. In maternal spindle transfer, assisted
reproductive techniques are used to obtain oocytes from the prospective mother and
a donor. The oocytes from the donor possess healthy mitochondria, while those
from the mother contain diseased mitochondria. The chromosomes, which are found
on one side of the egg in a spindle-shaped group, from the donor’s oocyte and the
mother’s oocyte are then removed. Afterwards, the mother’s chromosomes are
transferred to the now enucleated donor’s oocyte. The reconstructed oocyte now has
healthy mitochondria and can be fertilised in vitro before being transferred into the
mother or a surrogate. If the chromosomal carryover does not cause significant
mitochondrial heteroplasmy,4 the healthy mitochondria of the reconstructed oocyte
will be passed down via the maternal line to subsequent generations, cutting off the
mtDNA disease’s transmission. Finally, the donor’s chromosomes and the mother’s
enucleated oocyte are discarded (Tachibana et al. 2009; Nuffield Council on
Bioethics 2012).
In pronuclear transfer, two zygotes are created in vitro. One of them is created with
the prospective parents’ sperm and oocyte (or a sperm from a donor and the mother’s
oocyte), and the other one with a donated oocyte and the father’s (or donor’s) sperm.
During the first hours, after the sperm has fertilised the oocyte, the nuclear material of
both parents is enclosed in different membranes that are called the male and female
pronuclei. At day one in the development, and prior to their fusion, the two pronuclei
are removed from both zygotes. The pronuclei that were housed in the cell produced
with the donor’s oocyte, along with the now enucleated cell that was produced with the
mother’s oocyte, are discarded. Afterwards, the intending parents’ (or donor’s and
mother’s) pronuclei are transferred to the enucleated cell produced with the donor’s
oocyte. The reconstructed zygote is then transferred into the mother or a surrogate
(Craven et al. 2010; Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2012). Both techniques allow
parent(s) to have genetically related mtDNA disease-free children (supposing that the
techniques work and that there is no significant mutant mitochondria carryover during
Footnote 3 continued
Appleby (2015), Baylis (2013), Johnson (2013) and Bredenoord et al. (2010). On issues of disclosure of
MRT conception, see: Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2012) and Appleby (2015). On issues of MRTs
funding, see: Harris (2015), Harris (2016), Rulli (2016), de Melo-Martin (2017), Harris (2017) and
Palacios-Gonza´lez (2017). On issues of first in-human use, see: Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2012),
Institute of Medicine of the National Academies (2016) and Bredenoord and Braude (2010). On the
possible use of nonhuman oocytes for PNT, see Baylis (2009), and on the anonymity status of the
‘mitochondrial donor’, see Appleby (2016).
4 Deleterious mutations in the mitochondria can be present either in all mitochondria, referred to as
‘homoplasmy’, or only in some mitochondria, known as ‘heteroplasmy’. For recent research on MRTs
and mitochondrial carryover, see Hyslop et al. (2016) and Yamada et al. (2016)
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the procedures, which would allow for heteroplasmy to the point of the clinical
expression of the disease to occur).
One question that arises at this point is whether it is accurate to call these
techniques mitochondrial replacement techniques, if in fact what we are transferring
is nuclear DNA. Newman maintains that calling them MRTs ‘‘has been
instrumental in easing the way to public acceptance’’ but that this name is
scientifically inaccurate (Newman 2014a). The terms ‘maternal spindle transfer’ and
‘pronuclear transfer’ are scientifically accurate, so we cannot claim that they are
misnomers. However, we have to accept that according to how the techniques
should scientifically be described, by means of their common denominator, the
umbrella term ‘MRTs’ is a misnomer, since we are not transferring or replacing
mitochondria. Despite this, throughout the text I will use the acronym MRTs when
discussing both techniques. The justification for doing so is twofold. First, at this
stage of the debate the term MRTs has secured a foothold in the ethical discussion
of both techniques. Second, and most important, the strength of my counterargu-
ments is not affected by the scientific imprecision of the term. We can replace the
term ‘MRTs’ with any other umbrella term and the strength of my counterarguments
remains the same. If the reader believes that using the acronym MRTs has a harmful
propagandistic effect, then I suggest that every time she reads ‘MRTs’ she mentally
replaces it for the less alluring term ‘Nuclear DNA Replacement Techniques
Employed to Avoid mtDNA Disease’.
3 Harms to egg providers
In her article ‘‘The Ethics of Creating Children with Three Genetic Parents’’,
Franc¸oise Baylis (2013) advances two objections against MRTs based upon
potential harms to egg donors, because both techniques require egg donation from
women with healthy mitochondria. The first objection asserts that the harm–benefit
ratio, when donating oocytes for MRTs, is not favourable enough for pursuing
donation. The second objection is that the possible coercion and exploitation of
oocyte donors is reason enough for opposing it, thus ruling out mitochondrial
replacement.
3.1 Egg donation and the harm–benefit ratio
Baylis, rightly, notes that women who donate oocytes endure daily hormone shots
over a span of several days, and that these are uncomfortable, painful, and possess
mild to severe medical risks that could lead to
Cramping, abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting, bloating, mood changes and
irritability (…) [and more seriously] rapid weight gain and respiratory
difficulty, damage to the other organs such as the bladder, bowel and uterus,
decreased fertility, infertility and life-threatening haemorrhage, thromboem-
bolism and ovarian, breast or colon cancer. Potential psychological harms
include significant stress and sequelae. Baylis (2013, p. 532)
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With this clinical panorama as a background, Baylis argues that given that the
‘real’ benefit of enduring such inconveniences (having a child) is not going to be
enjoyed by the woman who suffers them (the donor), a harm–benefit calculation
would conclude against donating oocytes for MRTs procedures:
The egg provider bears the potential harms of hormonal stimulation and egg
retrieval; her only potential benefits are emotional (a good feeling from an act
of altruism) and possibly financial (if payment is involved). Baylis (2013,
p. 533)
Here Baylis appears to be claiming two things: that the donor does not benefit
enough from the donation, and that she suffers more harm than the egg recipient.
There are various problems with this objection. The first is a problem of framing: in
her article, Baylis fails to mention that the prevalence of serious complications is
very low (Delvigne 2009; Maxwell et al. 2008). In fact, severe ovarian
hyperstimulation syndrome, according to the World Health Organization, occurs
in only up to 0.2–1 % of all cycles in assisted reproduction (Binder et al. 2006).
Acknowledging this is important in order not to overstate the medical risks that
oocyte donation entails, which is not to say that egg donation is not invasive,
uncomfortable or painful.
The second problem is that if we accept her stance on what counts as an
acceptable harm–benefit ratio, then we would have to rule out as morally
permissible other types of organ donation (Johnson 2013). For example, we would
have to accept that cases in which ‘strangers’ decide to make live kidney donations
are immoral, and this is absurd (Praagh 2014). We would have to do so because
there is no benefit to the donor other than an emotional benefit and, sometimes, a
compensation for direct receipted expenses. At this point, we can identify the
mistake in Baylis’s reasoning: the assumption that there should be some kind of
quasi-symmetrical harm–benefit ratio between donor and recipient for donation to
be morally permissible. A quasi-symmetrical harm–benefit ratio between donor and
recipient is not a necessary condition for establishing the morality of pursuing
bodily donations that possess statistically low medical risk.
Finally, even if we assumed, for the sake of argument, that the harm–benefit ratio
relationship that Baylis endorses is appropriate for normatively assessing donation,
she ignores the fact that we could frame egg donation as a kind of supererogatory
action. This type of action is good to do, but it is not bad not to do it. What I mean
here is that even when there is no duty whatsoever to donate eggs doing so would be
morally commendable given that this would enable other people to carry on with
their reproductive goals. Egg donation for the purposes of MRTs can be seen as an
action that goes ‘‘beyond the call of duty’’ (Urmson 1958).
3.2 Exploitation and oocyte donation
The second objection that Baylis advances is that women, especially those who are
economically disadvantaged, are at risk of being coerced and exploited for their
eggs [as has been reported in developing countries such as India (Durgesh 2014)],
Mitochondrial replacement techniques: egg donation…
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and this is reason enough to oppose MRTs, in as much as they need donated
oocytes.5
It goes without saying that I, and every reasonable person, completely agree with
Baylis in that there should be strict legal safeguards against the coercion and
exploitation of women. Now, it should be noted that under Baylis’s account oocyte
donation seems not to be inherently exploitative; this means that oocyte donation is
not in itself morally objectionable but rather that it is objectionable only when
women are coerced or exploited. Therefore, as long as no exploitation or coercion
occurs this argument cannot be invoked as an objection to oocyte donation for
MRTs, or other assisted reproductive techniques. Furthermore, Baylis’s argument
loses its strength when legal safeguards against the exploitation of women are
appropriate, effective and in place. The regulation of MRTs could help fight against
the coercion and exploitation of women who donate oocytes if regulations included
adequate provisions regarding the circumstances in which oocyte donation is
permissible, and the conditions under which it should be carried out. For example,
procedures should be established to eliminate undue medical influence upon women
who are considering oocyte donation, and to determine what type of compensation,
if any, women should receive for oocyte retrieval.6,7
There are cases of oocyte donation that are morally unproblematic from a
coercion/exploitation point of view, and we do not regard as morally necessary that
the harm–benefit ratio of this type of bodily donation be quasi-symmetrical for
donors and recipients. This being the case, we can affirm that Baylis’s first two
objections fail to provide sufficient reasons for banning oocyte donation, and thus
impede research into MRTs or their application.
4 Genealogical ancestry
Baylis has also argued that ‘‘[m]itochondrial replacement technology represents a
potential threat to genealogical research using mtDNA analysis, as it would obscure
the lines of individual descent, thereby providing a false or confusing picture’’
(Baylis 2013, p. 533). It is true that MRTs could affect the interests of those who
5 In future, it might be possible to avoid oocyte retrieval altogether, if scientists are able to derive
functional oocytes from human induced pluripotent stem cells (Hayashi et al. 2012; Eguizabal et al. 2011;
Palacios-Gonza´lez et al. 2014).
6 In this regard, the UK is a good example. The UK’s HFEA, through its Code of Practice, has
established procedures for limiting the possibility that women are exploited throughout the donation
process, or coerced into oocyte donation (HFEA Code of Practice 2015, Chpt. 11).
7 While this paper was under review, the US Institute of Medicine of the National Academies (IOM)
published its report ‘Mitochondrial Replacement Techniques: Ethical, Social, and Policy Considerations’.
In it they recommend that MRTs researchers consider not only current guidance but also emerging best
practices in determining appropriate compensation for gamete providers, thus effectively improving the
gamete donation context: ‘‘It would be important for MRT researchers and institutions, in consultation
with local review committees or a central IRB, to consider current guidance and emerging best practices
in determining appropriate compensation for gamete providers, taking into account the demands placed
on a gamete provider by an MRT research protocol’’ (Institute of Medicine of the National Academies
2016, Sect. 4, p. 17).
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place value, either for identity purposes or academic research, on genealogical
information that can be traced by mtDNA, but we need to further investigate if this
is reason enough not to pursue such procedures.
First, it should be noted that it is open to further empirical investigation what
degree of mitochondrial heteroplasmy, caused by MRTs, would be necessary to
track down both genealogical lines (donor’s and mother’s). If very mild
mitochondrial heteroplasmy is sufficient to identify both genealogical lines then
the use of MRTs for reproductive purposes, as it caused such heteroplasmy, would
not necessarily imply the obscurement of genealogical lines. If this were the case
then Baylis’s objection would only apply to those cases of MRTs that did not cause
mitochondrial heteroplasmy, or that caused it to the extent that the genealogical line
of the woman who desires to be a genetic mother could not be traced.
Second, even if we accept, for the sake of argument, that genealogical research is
valuable enough to legitimately constrain people’s reproductive rights, this does not
entail that MRTs should be ruled out as reproductive options: we could counter the
problem by requiring both sex selection8 and disclosure in order to avoid
‘obscuring’ genealogical information.
We could require women, or couples, to select only for males when MRT
conceiving (Bredenoord et al. 2010; Appleby 2015),9 as doing so would assure that
genealogical research reliant upon mtDNA is only ‘disrupted’ in the first generation
of MRT-conceived men. All future mtDNA genealogical research on the family
lines of MRT-conceived men would not be affected, as mitochondria are inherited
via the maternal line.
However, while this answers the genealogical concern about future generations, a
problem remains: those men born from MRT conceptions may have an ‘obscured’
perception of their genealogical history. In order to address this issue, we could
additionally require that parents disclose to their children that they were MRT
conceived and that this was stated on their medical records (or birth certificates).
With this requirement, all MRT-conceived men with an interest in their
genealogical information would have an accurate picture of their genetic origins;
and scientists would be in a better position for doing research.
John Appleby has put forward three additional reasons, not based upon
arguments around genealogical research, for favouring disclosure in the context of
MRT conception: (i) children conceived this way need not be subject to the stress
and anxiety of worrying about having the same mtDNA disease as their mothers; (ii)
the MRT-conceived person’s own medical welfare; and (iii) the ability to report
problems to healthcare professionals for the sake of future generations (Appleby
2015, p. 507). Although these reasons are not directly related to genealogical
research, they further weaken Baylis’s objection (when considered in addition to
only male selection), by building a case for revealing their status to those that were
MRT conceived.
8 As previously said, Bredenoord and Braude (2010), Appleby (2015), and The Institute of Medicine of
the National Academies (2016) have examined the morality of sex selection for avoiding possible
transgenerational risks due to MRTs.
9 It is open to further investigation whether using sex selection for the purpose of allowing genealogical
research is open to the same criticism as when used for nonmedical purposes.
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If we consider disclosure and sex selection together, then an argument based on
the ‘obscurement’ of genealogical information loses its grip: firstly because MRT-
conceived men would have a clear picture of their mtDNA status, and thus of how
their conception affects the genealogical information obtainable through their
mtDNA. Furthermore, they can access genealogical information by means of their
mother’s mtDNA, if she granted her consent for doing so. Secondly, any
‘disruption’ caused by MRTs would be ‘contained’ by the first generation of
MRT-conceived men, as those who follow would inherit their mitochondria via the
maternal line.10
A third attack on Baylis’s objection shows that the use of MRTs falls within our
reproductive rights, and that these rights trump any kind of genealogical research
claim that scientists may have. If we accept that the use of assisted reproductive
techniques, for example IVF, falls under the scope of our reproductive rights (even
if such rights only entail the non-interference of third parties in our reproductive
choices), then we have to accept that MRTs also fall within our reproductive rights.
We have to accept this because MRTs, just as other assisted reproductive
techniques, both allow us to fulfil our reproductive aims and do not harm the
children produced by them.11 Now, the goals of scientific research trump over
people’s reproductive rights only under the most extreme circumstances. At this
point we need to note two things. First, the aims of genealogical research are
‘obstructed’ by MRTs in only a handful of cases. It is expected, by the UK
Department of Health (2014, p. 38), that only 10 children would be the product of
MRTs every year. Second, and more importantly, the benefits of genealogical
research that would be forfeited because some people employ MRTs are so
insignificant that they do not satisfy the extremeness condition for curtailing
people’s reproductive rights. Finally, Baylis herself concedes that her objection is
not very strong, admitting that while ‘‘preserving the ability of DNA genealogists to
do their research may not be a high social priority, it is nonetheless deserving of
consideration recognizing that little is known at this time about personal and
cultural attitudes towards mtDNA’’ (Baylis 2013, p. 533).
I have shown that genealogists do not have a strong enough claim to trump
people’s reproductive rights, but what about parental attitudes towards genealogical
information? Although empirical data are missing to support the following claim I
contend that it is commonsensical to assume that if faced with a choice between
using MRTs or conceiving a child at risk of developing a mtDNA disease most
people would choose MRTs despite the concern of obscuring genealogical
information. It seems quite implausible that people (present and future) would
forgo having mtDNA disease free children, in order that their children with mtDNA
10 The IOM report, following Baylis (2013), also found that ‘‘[t]he novel combination of mtDNA and
nDNA that would result from MRT blurs traditional notions of relatedness in ways that may undermine
intergenerational connections and lineage as measured by mtDNA’’ (Institute of Medicine of the National
Academies 2016, Sect. 3, p. 18). It is interesting to note that even when the IOM report’s final
recommendation is to choose for males, when carrying out initial clinical investigations on MRTs, they
missed that this would contain any disruption to the ‘natural’ mtDNA intergenerational connection.
11 There is only one instance of MRTs that could harm the child produced through them (see next
section), but this possibility is highly unlikely to ensue.
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diseases are be able to know, through mtDNA, their ‘un-obscured’ ancestry. It is
important to remember that people could access their mtDNA genealogical
information matrilinealilly, if needed, and that people with mtDNA diseases
contemplate MRTs because mtDNA diseases cause pain, are debilitating, and life
shortening.
5 Are we transferring mitochondria or nuclear DNA?
Stuart A. Newman, Professor of Cell Biology and Anatomy at New York Medical
College, has claimed that those advocating MRTs are intentionally misguiding the
public debate by using the name ‘mitochondrial transfer’ or ‘mitochondrial
replacement’. According to him, scientists and media commentators are portraying
the techniques as only transferring mitochondrial DNA, when in reality what is
being transferred is nuclear DNA. By presenting MRTs as if they were only
transferring 0.1 % of the total DNA material (mtDNA is composed of only 37
genes), they are trying to win wide public support while skewing the debate:
It is clear, however, that much more than mitochondria is being transferred or
donated in MST [maternal spindle transfer]. This is obscured in most reports
on the subject, even in scientific journals. A recent report in the journal Na-
ture states, ‘The technique [combines] genetic material from a mitochondria
donor, the mother who provides the nucleus and a father.’ To use the emotive
term ‘mother’ only for the donor of the maternal set of chromosomes
downplays the unique biological role of the oocyte and of the woman who
contributes it. It has the further effect of endorsing the false assertion of
MST’s advocates that the procedure comes down to the transfer of a few (i.e.
the mitochondrial) genes. What is actually being transferred are 20,000 or so
genes provided by the chromosome donor. (Newman 2014b)
While it is true that the term ‘mitochondrial replacement techniques’ is a
misnomer [as discussed in Sect. (2)], the important question is—does the amount of
DNA being transferred matter? Newman believes it does. He maintains that large-
scale genetic material transfer for reproductive purposes (i.e. MRTs) should not be
attempted because this would open ‘‘the door to routine applications of germline
(i.e. inheritable) gene modification.’’Newman (2014b).
Newman’s objection against MRTs is that once we allow, for reproductive
purposes, the transfer of nuclear DNA, with its ‘‘20,000 or so genes’’, we would also
be committed to allowing other germline modifications. He pictures a world where
once we have accepted MRTs, we would also accept a kind of ‘selectionist’
eugenics:
The procedures described [MRTs], currently under evaluation by the British
Human Fertilisation and Embryo Authority (HFEA) for the prevention of
‘‘mitochondrial diseases,’’ would carry profoundly negative implications for
the future of the human species were they ever implemented, and thus warrant
much wider concern than what they have attracted up to now. In particular,
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they will facilitate a new form of eugenics, the improvement of humans by
deliberately choosing their inherited traits. (Newman 2013)
There are three possible ways in which to address Newman’s objection. The first
is to examine whether the conclusion (i.e. becoming a ‘selectionist’ eugenics
society) is something that we would morally want to avoid. While historical forms
of eugenics (i.e. coercive state mandated positive and negative eugenics aimed at
improving the human ‘stock’) are morally appalling, the case for liberal eugenics
has been successfully defended by Nicholas Agar (2004). According to Agar, liberal
societies ought to respect people’s conception of human excellence (i.e. liberal
societies should allow for a pluralistic view of what counts as a good life), and this
respect should extend to the way people decide to make their children. He maintains
that there should be two restrictions to liberal eugenics: (i) biotechnologies should
not be used to solve complex social problems (e.g. racism) and (ii) children born
from such biotechnologies ought not to be harmed. If, as I contend, Agar has shown
that liberal eugenics is morally defensible then Newman’s objection is unsuccessful
if MRTs are not aimed at solving a complex social problem, which they are not, and
if MRTs do not harm the children produced by them.
An important question to answer here is whether MRTs can cause harm to the
children conceived this way? MRTs cannot harm these children, as for an action to
harm someone it needs to make that person worse off than she would have been had
the action not taken place (Feinberg 1986). MRTs cannot make anyone worse off,
because without them being employed these individuals would not have existed in
the first place: this is known as the non-identity effect (Boonin 2008; Lawlor 2015).
MRTs determine the identity (identity in the sense of what genetic material
individuates a biological being) of who would be ‘brought’ into existence by
affecting which gametes will fuse. For example, the use of MRTs affects the timing
of conception, and thus they affect which particular sperm will fertilise the
intending mother’s oocyte. Ultimately, the choice is not between a life where one
was affected by MRTs and another where one was not affected by MRTs. The
decision is between existence and non-existence.
The only exception to this is when we have preselected a sperm and egg, for our
reproductive purposes, before we decide to use MRTs. In those scenarios, the use of
MRTs does not affect which sperm and oocyte will fuse, and so it is true that things
could have been otherwise for these MRT-conceived children.12
The second way in which we can address Newman’s objection is to show that in
practice (i.e. in the real world) the acceptance of MRTs does not send us down the
slippery slope of accepting all germline modifications. This can easily be done by
pointing out how the UK has regulated on MRTs [and legislates in relation to
12 Wrigley et al. (2015) have defended that there is a moral difference between pronuclear transfer and
maternal spindle transfer, in that the former is a form of therapy, while the latter is an instance of selective
reproduction. They advance that the identity of the person who will be ‘brought’ into existence, in the
case where pronuclear transfer will be carried out, is already determined via its genetic endowment and
thus we should regard such a technique as therapeutic and morally preferable to maternal spindle transfer.
These authors’ assertion, in fact, is only true for those cases where we have selected, beforehand, a sperm
and egg for our reproductive purposes. This is so because, in all other instances, the identity of who will
be ‘brought’ into existence is dependent on the MRTs taking place.
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assisted reproductive techniques (HFE Act 1990, as amended 2008)], and how the
US Institute of Medicine has reacted to the possibility of MRTs. The UK has created
legislation on assisted reproductive techniques on a case by case basis. Therefore,
against this context, the claim that to accept MRTs is to mount the slippery slope is
misleading (Lords Discusses Mitochondrial Donation—News from Parliament
2015).
The US Institute of Medicine, on the other hand, has established a special
committee to discuss the ethical and policy questions around MRTs (Institute of
Medicine of the National Academies 2015). This indicates that the consideration or
acceptance of MRTs does not entail, in practice, that other germline modifying
techniques, or DNA transferring techniques, would be automatically and unreflec-
tively accepted. For example, while MRTs have been accepted in the UK, somatic
cell nuclear transfer (i.e. cloning) for reproductive purposes has not been so.
Regardless of whether the UK’s decision regarding reproductive cloning is cogent,
this shows that in practice the fact that one technique is accepted does not entail that
all other ‘similar’ techniques would be accepted.
We can interpret Newman’s argument, alternatively, as one regarding (theoret-
ical) moral consistency, and not one aimed at predicting how germline modifica-
tions would be regulated in the real world. According to this interpretation, if we
conclude that MRTs are morally permissible then consistency requires that we
regard all other germline modifications as morally permissible. Even if we favour
this reading of Newman’s argument, it will not get us far: there is a distinction to be
made between the in general moral acceptability of germline modifications, and the
moral acceptability of particular germline modifications. It does not follow from the
fact that in general we accept germline modifications as morally permissible that all
instances of germline modifications are morally permissible. There are particular
instances of germline modification that would undoubtedly be immoral to carry out.
For example, inserting a gene into an early embryo whose only function would be to
cause unbearable pain, if this was ever possible. This is a germline modification
because all future generations will inherit the pain-causing gene, and it is clearly
immoral to carry out such an intervention. All germline modifications need to be
ethically assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Finally, a third way to address Newman’s objection is to point out that even when
MRTs are a kind of large-scale genetic material transfer, they do not necessarily
amount to germline modifications. Neither maternal spindle transfer nor pronuclear
transfer necessarily amounts to germline modifications if we hold that a necessary
condition for a genetic modification to be regarded as a germline one is that such
modification can be inherited. Through sperm sorting or preimplantation genetic
diagnosis after MRT, we could only select males. This would prevent any
possibility that the ‘transferred’ mitochondria could be inherited13: the nature of
13 It should be noted that this could change if, by means of in vitro gametogenesis, we were able to derive
functional gametes of both sexes from male iPSC, as previously noted (Palacios-Gonza´lez et al. 2014;
Hu¨bner et al. 2003; Kerkis et al. 2007; Lacham-Kaplan et al. 2006). It could happen that a MRT-
conceived man decided to use his cells to produce an oocyte. If this occurred, then all instances of MRTs
could amount to germline modifications. One way of dealing with this issue would be to always require
that the other person involved in the reproductive process produced the oocyte (supposing that one of
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mitochondrial inheritance is such that we can only refer to MRTs as ‘germline-
modifying techniques’ when they affect females, by either bringing them into
existence or by treating their mtDNA disease, since it is only in this case when the
‘modification’ could be inherited.14 Realising this shows that Newman’s germline
modification objection is not really that strong.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown that three of the recent objections against MRTs,
advanced by Baylis and Newman, are flawed. I have also shown that even if for the
sake of argument we accept those objections that are not patently indefensible, they
do not rule out all instances of MRTs. This last finding is of paramount importance
for those operating both under an ethical and legal bio-conservative framework,
since it helps them to build a bio-conservative case for MRTs. The fact that these
three ethical objections fail is significant from a policymaking perspective. Indeed,
this shows that the recent decision by the UK parliament (HFE Regulations 2015) to
allow MRTs can be ethically defended against these specific attacks, and therefore
helps to pave down the ethical road for other legislatures where MRTs are being
discussed, such as the US.
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